enerally,
energy issues are usually thought about in terms of increased demand
for energy and not in terms of the amount of energy that can be
conserved or used efficiently. For preserving organizational power of
a public utility this may be seen as the best way to go, but is it in
the best interests of society and the environment?
(photo: Minnesota Pollution Control Agency)
To begin answering this timely question, let us
consider the following for New Brunswick. In the early 90's, the
provincial government began considering energy policy in view of
increasing energy efficiency and promoting conservation. Their first
step was to commission Marbek Resources Consultants to identify the
potential. In 1992, the completed Marbek study estimated the amount of
wasted energy in NB to be around 1000 megawatts. The government of the
time however, never acted on the report's recommendations to establish
an energy efficiency strategy to actually achieve some of the savings
identified.
Such a potential is still there today and constitutes a very
significant source of energy quite easily saved and put to other uses
with the help of available environmentally appropriate technologies.
This potential is also much more than the 630 megawatts produced by
the Point Lepreau nuclear reactor, thereby offering us a window of
opportunity for considering not a costly attempt at refurbishing but
rather the closing of the Point Lepreau reactor which is less an asset
and more a burden and a problem for New Brunswickers. It also
increasingly appears to be a more dangerous nuclear installation than
previously thought, as has been acknowledged by the authorities who
recently increased the danger zone around Point Lepreau.
Economical considerations are always an important element to be
considered, now and in the past. In the early 70's, the Hatfield
government's decision to go forward with Point Lepreau was taken in
the context of rising energy prices and of promised nuclear energy
"too cheap to meter". The province's initial cost resistance
was overcome by the Federal government's January 1974 decision that
Ottawa would finance 50% of a province's first nuclear power plant.
Shortly after, in February, NB announced that it was going nuclear.
The first site considered was in the Acadian peninsula, near Anse
Bleu, where a very strong and determined public opposition developed
and won the day. The second site, in Point Lepreau, seen as being able
to accommodate four reactors, was essentially forced on the local
people who were also very critical and wanted a public debate on this
question. The government refused, stating that the decision had
already been taken for technical reasons and was irreversible. This
fait accompli approach and non-democratic process became the object of
strong public criticism that led quickly in 1974 to the formation of
the Maritime Energy Coalition, one of Canada's first regional
antinuclear organizations.
(photo: CBC News, Point Lepreau)
The initial estimates for the cost of this reactor in early 1974
were in the range of 400 million dollars. This was quickly
re-evaluated at 700 million dollars in May 1975, with work to be
finished in 1979. Lepreau only became operational in June 1983 and was
critiqued as a major technological project that came in with very
large time and cost overruns, having a final cost of 1.4 billion
dollars, excluding interest payments to be paid over the years.
This also gave way to significant financial problems for NB. Ottawa
was willing to pay 50% of the cost estimate of 700 million, not 50% of
1.4 billion. This left NB much less enamoured with the nuclear option
as this issue was never resolved in the province's favor and turned
out to be the beginning of NB Power's large debt load that now stands
at over 3 billion dollars. A second reactor was also never ordered,
partly because of public opposition and partly in order not to relive
such an episode. Lepreau was also developed without the U.S.
participation that had initially been envisaged and this led to below
cost exports across the border, thus further undermining the economics
of the project.
From early on, the Point Lepreau nuclear reactor was shown to the
world as a showcase for the export of Canadian CANDU reactors. The
main objective was to emphasize high performance levels that for a
time were somewhat impressive in regards to competing U.S., European
and Russian nuclear reactors. We have now learnt that apparently NB
Power cut some corners in order to maintain such high levels of
performance. This also seems to have led to an organizational culture
of nuclear recklessness that increasingly worried the Atomic Energy
Control Board (AECB) in the 90's and contributed to ongoing frictions
between NB Power and AECB. The latest AECB (now the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission-CNSC) licensing process was somewhat of an arduous
process for NB Power and CNSC is still monitoring intensively.
On a practical level, as with other reactors, Lepreau has had its
share of technical and human induced errors and problems, some of
which are still quite disquieting, such as the thirty 4 cm screws from
a temporary forgotten wooden cover that was sucked into the calendria
upon start-up of the reactor after yet another shutdown. The wood
floated and was recovered, but not the screws! Now a more fundamental
technical flaw is overtaking Canadian nuclear reactors, one that was
foreseen and denounced early on by antinuclear scientists and
environmentalists but expertly dismissed by pro-nuclear scientists and
technocrats eager to promote this sector and its various career
opportunities. In fact, as a result of intense heat, radiation and
chemistry in the reactor core, key nuclear reactor metal structures (calendria
tubes, pressure tubes and feeder pipes) are increasingly becoming
brittle and weak, thus shortening the reactor's expected full useful
life of 30 to 40 years by around half. It is this premature aging that
explains NB Power's current public promotional efforts for a very
costly and never before attempted rebuilding of these nuclear reactor
key components in order to extend beyond a reactor's useful life. NB
Power now says that this will cost 845 million dollars, well beyond
initial cost estimates of 500 to 700 million dollars. Probably very
much more if the past is our guide. And if successful, for how many
years of useful life? A more limited effort at the Pickering nuclear
station, aimed at achieving full useful life (not extended life) by
replacing mainly the pressure tubes, has already cost more than a
billion dollars and has yet to be successful. This failed attempt to
save Ontario's nuclear technology was also one of the main reasons for
Ontario Hydro's financial collapse in 1997.
